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Religion and Education in a Secular Age:  
A Comparative Perspective
Peter van der Veer
The modern nation-state demands its subjects to be disciplined and educated 
in a national curriculum. That curriculum contains the basic elements of modern 
science, required for educating an adequate workforce, but also basic elements 
of national culture, such as language and history. Religion can be regarded as 
part of national culture, but in secularist states students are taught to reject that part of culture, see it as a historical aberration and become atheist. I deine here 
secularism as a project to remove religion from public life and, if possible even 
from public consciousness, that can be in Communist societies, such as China. It 
bears family resemblance with secularist projects in non-Communist societies, 
such as France, but it is much more extreme. Secularism as an ideology offers a teleology of religious decline and can function as a self-fulilling prophecy. It 
is important to examine the role of intellectuals in furthering this understanding 
of history but also their relation to sources of power: state apparatuses and 
social movements. Secularism is a forceful ideology when carried by political 
movements that capture both the imagination and the means to mobilize social 
energies. At the same time it is important to attend to the utopian and, indeed, 
religious elements in secularist projects in order to understand why many of 
these movements seem to tap into traditional and modern sources of witchcraft, 
millenarianism, and charisma. Moreover, we need to consider the secular and 
the religious as mutually constitutive, so that also what is religious is shaped 
by secularism.
As long as religion has not been successfully removed from society (and 
in reality it never is which constantly fuels the secularist project) it needs to 
be regulated. As a project secularism has its ends (atheist society), its means 
(education), its resources (taxation) but, importantly, also its obstacles and limitations. It is sometimes strongly supported by state oficials and political 
leaders and sometimes it is deemed of less importance or even discarded. Its description therefore requires historical and spatial speciicity. In Shanghai today 
Peter van der Veer
236
(but not in the 1920s) it is hard to ind public manifestations of religion (although one can ind them), but in Xiamen, for instance, it is not dificult at all. Since 
intellectuals are central to education and the understanding of national culture 
and, in many cases like China, are civil servants connected to the state their 
debates require special attention, as is shown, for instance, in the membership 
of the French Stasi Commission that advised the government on its relation to 
Islam (among others Mohammed Arkoun, Régis Debray, Alain Touraine, Gilles 
Kepel, Jean Baubérot, well-known French intellectuals and scholars).
Secularism as a project is different from secularization as a process. In 
Western Europe (but not in the USA) we see a process of “unchurching,” 
in which there is a decline of church membership and church attendance. In 
such secularized societies, like the Netherlands or Germany, one may still 
have schools that are governed by a school board that belongs to a religious community, but inancially supported by tax money and under the supervision 
of state inspection, while the curriculum is hardly different from state schools. 
In Europe today religion is mostly taught in as a secular subject of interest in 
developing multiculturalism. This again is different from India (a society that is 
in many ways comparable to China) where religious communities are teaching 
their own religion in state-sponsored schools, but within the framework of a 
national curriculum. The location of religion in educating national subjects is, 
obviously, a function of the location of religion in the imagination of the nation. 
If religious education has to take place entirely outside of the state-supported school system religious groups need to ind other sites for educating its members 
in the basic tenets of the faith and the methods of religious communication.
Religious Education
Education is central to religion. To be able to send, receive, and interpret the 
religious message one needs to be educated. Despite the Deist claim that religion 
is natural, it is in fact culturally acquired. One could perhaps compare learning 
a religion with learning a language, and indeed ritual communication has often 
been studied as a form of language. Many religions have ritual manuals about 
what to do when and for what purpose and this practical knowledge may be 
more important than the content of what people believe, or their “inner states,” 
although some religions, especially Protestantism, do put a lot of emphasis on interiority. This is not to say that the concept of “belief” has no signiicance in 
Chinese religions. Buddhism does have a set of dogmas and does emphasize 
liberating insight or belief as an important step towards the end of suffering. The 
education in sacred truth, in sacred rituals, in correct behavior is an indispensable 
element of religions. If we think of the ways in which we are socialized to 
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understand symbols (religious and non-religious) and their relation to practice it 
is clear that we have to study not only religions but also how religious symbols 
become authoritative in relation to other representations and discourses. 1 For 
example, if one becomes a Buddhist in a Communist country Buddhist symbols 
are discursively constructed and understood in relation to the dominant (or 
state-supported) discourse of Communism. Where does this education take place? People are, irst of all, educated within 
their families and one should never forget how important early socialization 
within the family is for acquiring particular habits, patterns of thought, both 
linguistic and extra-linguistic. It is also in the family that religious dispositions 
are acquired. This kind of informal education has been dominant everywhere 
till the 19th century and still prevails in many parts of the world. Given the 
gendered division of labor in many societies fathers and mothers have often a 
different role in religious education. In Brahman families in India it is often the 
mother that imparts a devotional sensibility, while the father often educates his 
sons in ritual and theological knowledge. 
A special case is the “home schooling” movement in the USA that has 
brought formal education into the family in one of the technologically most 
advanced societies in the world. The rise of formal education outside the 
family has been a 20th-century phenomenon and in many places only a late-
20th-century phenomenon. In societies in which one does not have enough 
schools for the population informal education in the family is still the only 
thing available. Where one does have a developed school system it remains 
important, as Bourdieu points out, that there is a synergy between familial and school education for acquiring speciic knowledge, tastes, and skills for the 
reproduction of class.  2
One way of estimating the spread of education in a society is looking at 
literacy rates. Even in a fast developing society as India literacy is not universal 
and the literacy rate is around 74 percent in 2011 and shows great gender 
disparity (82 percent for men, 65 percent for women). This is different in China 
where literacy is above 90 percent now, but for most of its history China has had 
low literacy rates like everywhere else. Illiterate parents cannot teach children 
to be literate, so that the spread of formal education is essential in acquiring 
literacy skills. Such skills have also their effects on religion, since reading and 
comprehending religious texts transform the ways in which religious dispositions 
are formed. It can, for instance, be argued that the translation of the Bible in 
the vernacular and its spread by means of the new printing technology made 
1. Asad, Genealogies of Religion, p. 31-32.
2. Bourdieu, The State Nobility.
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Protestantism attractive. It is therefore important to realize that large parts of 
the population of China were illiterate till relatively recently and that this fact is 
relevant to understand the nature of religion in China in the past and its change 
in the present.
Outside of the family it is the temple and the monastery that are throughout 
history sites of education. Again, it is relatively recent that they have been rivaled 
or overtaken by state sponsored schools. It was only in the late 19th century that 
in Europe the old universities of Oxford and Cambridge were loosening their 
ties with the state church. Still, many of the arrangements in these universities 
(and elsewhere in Europe) recall the religious nature of higher learning. This was 
also true for China, obviously. To be educated for major administrative positions 
one needed to learn interpretations of the classical canon that were tied up with 
an imperial ritual system and a Confucian cosmology. The centralization of 
the examination system has been one of the major features of the development 
of the bureaucracy in China and looked at with admiration from outside of 
China. It does not seem to be correct to see this as a secular system, since it 
partly promoted what one could call a Confucian mind-set, a kind of moral and 
political theory, as well as a ritual complex that legitimated the sacred nature 
of the imperial system. 3
Secular Rationality
This raises the question of the rise of secularism. The reformers at the end of 
the Qing period were in many respects not very different from reformers in India 
or other parts of Asia. Their main concern was to provide a modern curriculum 
that would enable their societies to “catch up” with the fast modernization of Europe. Very important in the 19th century is the growing centrality of scientiic 
knowledge in which empirical observations are combined with mathematical 
models. It is not anymore the case that knowledge is produced within a religious 
system or with reference to a classical canon. It is produced outside of that system 
and in principle indifferent to it. The main element in that indifference is that 
religious claims for fundamental knowledge about nature become increasingly untenable and cannot be allowed to obstruct scientiic inquiry. The secular 
(not secularist) demand for better education to enable progress does not have 
to do away with religion and in many cases in Europe, the USA, or India it 
does not. In principle religious schools can accommodate rational inquiry and scientiic knowledge. In fact, Christian schools in Europe and in the colonies 
in the late 19th century often prided themselves on the excellence of their 
3. Elman & Woodside (eds.), Education and Society in Late Imperial China.
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secular curriculum. Indeed, major schools and institutions of higher education 
in India and China have their origin in Christian missions. After the polemics 
surrounding Darwin’s discoveries a split occurred in Protestant churches between those who accepted the indings of modern science and those who rejected it. In 
the Catholic Church the authority of the Pope determined the relation between 
science and religion, but gradually Catholicism has also embraced the notion 
that it is completely in tune with modern science which effectively means that it has abandoned its authority in this ield. 4
In the 19th century a substantial number of Protestant institutions began 
to develop the stance that modern science was compatible with Christianity, 
creating a growing split between liberal (“progressive”) Protestantism and forms 
of traditional Protestantism (Evangelicalism, Pentecostalism, and others) that rejected especially Darwinism. In the missionary ield this liberal perspective 
on modern Christianity was accompanied by the claim that other religions were 
“backward” and an obstacle to progress. From a 19th-century evolutionary 
perspective Christianity belonged to an “advanced” society, while religions like 
Islam, Hinduism, or Daoism could be portrayed as steeped in ignorance. This 
attack on the backwardness of native religions led in turn to native apologetics that stressed the scientiic nature of the religions in question and often claimed their scientiic superiority. In that way religion’s relation to science became a 
major criterion for its suitability to modern society.
If religious education cannot anymore impart knowledge about nature it 
can still be important in teaching moral conduct. An important distinction that 
is made in the 19th century and is prevalent till today is that between magic as pseudo-science and religion as a source of positive morality. We ind a classic statement of this opposition in Edward Tylor’s work, but more inluential has 
been Weber’s theory of rationalization and disenchantment. Weber does not argue that there is a process of decline of religion, but rather that religion puriies itself from magical elements and reaches (irst of all in Protestantism) a higher 
stage of morality and rationality that is conducive to economic and societal 
progress. While Weber emphasizes the role of religious groups, priests and 
charismatic innovators in this process of rationalization, Marx sees such groups 
as simple tools of the ruling class and the religious morality of capitalism as 
another form of magic, namely commodity fetishism that has to be overcome 
to allow for the liberation of the people. Both strands of sociological analysis, based in Enlightenment thought, have had great inluence on the issue of religion 
and education in China. Popular religion or superstition (mixin) were forms of 
magic and people had to be educated to discard these wrong beliefs. Monastic 
4. Fassin, “The Geopolitics of Vatican Theology”.
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religions, such as Buddhism and Daoism, were seen as too much connected to 
popular magic to be able to perform this task of educating the masses. Reformers 
like Taixu in Buddhism responded to that by proposing substantial reforms in 
Buddhism to make it a modern, national religion with transnational connections. 
National Religion
The move to make religion into the source of national morality, conducive 
to progress, requires the nationalization of religion. 5 This development we ind 
both in Europe and in Asia in the second half of the 19th century. Religion becomes one of the ields of disciplinary practice in which the modern self 
is produced. It is seen as not only important in the production of the modern 
subject but also in the production of the modern public. Consequently, religion is 
important not only in the shaping of religious conscience and civilized conduct, 
but also in the creation of the public sphere. In Britain and in India missionary 
movements have been central to the development of a public sphere in which 
not only modern Christianity, but also religious reform in other religions as 
well as anti-colonialism was shaped. Although Christian conversion had some 
success in the colonized world and in India and China it remained marginal in 
terms of numbers, the real impact has been on indigenous religions. In India a 
number of Hindu and Muslim reform movements built their own schools and 
universities with a modern curriculum and a nationalist agenda. In China this 
seems to have been less the case, although attempts were made to introduce a 
Confucian nationalism in the schools. However, these were state schools and 
not schools supported by religious movements. In his paper for this issue Liu Xun shows that the Nanyang Daoist monastery did start modern schools and 
vocational training programs. This then was an initiative taken by Daoist clergy 
with the support of the laity and thus dependent on donations in the form of 
temple lands. By being dependent on landholdings they were easy targets for secularist attacks. Lay movements are much more dificult to target, since they 
spring from the common people that make up the nation. According to Angela 
Leung the Yangtze Delta had already a substantial number of charitable schools 
in the 17th and 18th centuries. 6 In her analysis these community schools for the 
poor were important instruments in a cultural war against an emerging popular 
culture. Here, again, is the remarkable emphasis on disciplining rather than 
5. Van der Veer, “L’État moral: religion, nation et Empire dans la Grande-Bretagne 
Victorienne et l’Inde britannique.”
6. Leung, “Elementary Education in the Lower Yangtze Region in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries.”
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educating the masses that continues till the present day. It shows how much 
earlier elite misgivings about popular religion preceded the modernist anti-
religion campaigns in the 19th and 20th centuries.
The concerted attacks on religious institutions and the professed emphasis on 
building secular schools is something we know from Communist rule everywhere. 
In that sense Communism is a true heir of the Jacobinism of the French revolution. 
However, the Chinese case is different from, say, East-European cases in that 
these attacks started long before the victory of Communism. As many scholars 
have pointed out attacks on religious institutions under the rubric of removing 
obstacles to progress began already in the last decades of the Qing dynasty. 
Various forms of nationalism try to destroy popular religion which includes 
arbitrarily from time to time forms of formal, monastic Daoist and Buddhist 
religion. This is completely different from the Indian case in which religion is 
the basis of anti-colonial nationalism. It is Christian colonialism that is seen 
by many Indian nationalists as threatening the nation despite the fact that the 
colonial government takes pains in showing religious neutrality and in many 
ways distances itself from Christian missions. In India therefore the educational ield is illed with religious initiatives of a wide variety of movements and 
communities who all want to stem the expansion of Christianity and enhance 
the upward mobility of their group or community. In China it is the indigenous 
state itself, however pressurized by imperial forces, that takes on the competition 
with the West and turns against the indigenous religion as cause of the nation’s 
backwardness. In the last analysis it is the nature of state-society relations that 
determines the location of religion in it. In India in the early 19th century the 
East India Company was giving patronage to temples and festivals, following 
the pattern of Hindu and Muslim kingdoms. It is only under great pressure from 
Christian evangelical groups in Britain that the company was forced to withdraw 
its support of “idolatrous, heathen” practices and develop a policy of religious 
neutrality. However, this was only a withdrawal of sorts since the British then 
became very active in setting up systems and committees to manage religious 
endowments. These committees, in turn, became important arenas for organizing 
the public sphere, for both Hindus and Muslims. 7
The Language of Instruction and the Instruction of Language
This is not to deny that all colonial parties – missionaries, traders, and 
administrators – understood civil society to be based on Christian civilization and 
thus supported all efforts to use education to reform Indian society. To advocate 
7. Van der Veer, Imperial Encounters.
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the spread of English to the higher classes as against supporting the “oriental 
languages” the administrator Thomas Babington Macaulay (himself a son of 
a missionary) wrote a famous Minute on India Education (1835) in which the 
education in English literature was recommended to spread civilization, from 
which I want to cite the following telling passage: 
I have no knowledge of either Sanscrit or Arabic. -But I have done what I could to 
form a correct estimate of their value. I have read translations of the most celebrated 
Arabic and Sanscrit works. I have conversed both here and at home with men distinguished by their proiciency in the Eastern tongues. I am quite ready to take 
the Oriental learning at the valuation of the Orientalists themselves. I have never 
found one among them who could deny that a single shelf of a good European library 
was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia. The intrinsic superiority of 
the Western literature is, indeed, fully admitted by those members of the Committee 
who support the Oriental plan of education. 
It is both missionary and secular literature that is put to the service of educating the natives. This point is of more general signiicance given the importance 
of literature (prose and poetry) to educate elites about themselves (emotions, 
intentions, meaning of life) in modern societies, in which sacred texts have lost 
their monopoly of moral education. It is modern English education in literature 
and science that does the civilizing work, while Indian classical learning, rooted 
in Hindu or Muslim civilization, is discarded or marginalized. 
One may suggest that the opposition between secular and religious needs to 
be redrawn in India under colonial conditions between modern secular Christian 
on the one hand and traditional religious Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, Taoist on the 
other. Macaulay’s speech as a Member of the India Council highlights another 
element that is of high importance in Indian education: 
We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us 
and the millions whom we govern, -a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, 
but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.
India, obviously, was impossible to govern from small and far-away England 
and was thus to be ruled by native servants of the Empire. Colonial policy made 
English into an Indian language which it is today, but simultaneously it made it 
into the language of the ruling class which it continues to be. In India, therefore, we ind a “split” public sphere with English on the one hand and the various 
vernacular languages on the other.
Written Mandarin, largely based on Northern dialects of Chinese, has been a great uniier in Chinese dynastic history for a very long time and this has been 
reinforced by the Imperial examinations. There has therefore never been a doubt 
that it would continue to be the language of instruction in Republican China. It 
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has further undergone a major standardization and simpliication in the PRC. 
The distinction that one makes in India between English and vernaculars is 
made in China between “the common language” (putonghua) and the various 
dialects and languages that are spoken in China (and are in a number of cases 
mutually unintelligible). This produces a linguistic situation that is more similar 
to Europe where the state language (dependent on centralized education) 
marginalizes local and regional languages than to India where the colonial 
situation produced a split public sphere and an education system that employed 
besides English a number of vernaculars as languages for instruction. Given 
the dominance of Mandarin Chinese in China there is also much less scope for 
regional demands to be instructed in regional languages instead of Mandarin. 
This in turn makes separatism on the basis of language less viable than in India. 
In fact, in China it is not ethno-linguistic mobilization, but the state in its Ethno-National Identiication Project of the 1950-70s that irst classiies 56 oficially 
recognized ethnicities (partly based on linguistic criteria) and then develops 
guidelines for the strengthening of minority education, including language. This 
ethnicity policy has come under intense pressure after the reforms of 1978 from 
arguments that blame language for the “backwardness” of minorities which has 
led to the new National Common Language Law of the PRC, passed in 2000, 
which requires knowledge of Chinese to qualify for citizenship. 8 The effects of 
mass migration to the urban centers of China on linguistic diversity can similarly 
be expected to be substantial.
In India linguistic nationalism per se has not led to the break-up of the nation-state, but a linguistic coniguration has developed in which large numbers of 
people speak three languages: English, Hindi (a widespread national language 
that is also used in Bollywood movies) and the regional language. In combination 
with religion, however, language became one of the elements in the political 
mobilization of Hindus and Muslims. Urdu and Hindi are basically the same 
language, but Urdu uses Perso-Arabic script and a vocabulary largely derived 
from Arabic and Farsi, while Hindi is written in Sanskritic script and uses a 
Sanskritic vocabulary. The spoken language (often called Hindustani) was, more or less, a mix between these vocabularies with local and regional inluences. 
From the end of the 19th century language mobilization around Hindi and 
Urdu, especially focusing on the language of education and administration and 
thus on the availability of government jobs, were an important part of growing 
communal antagonism. Despite the fact that Muslims in different parts of India 
spoke regional languages Urdu became the language of Muslim separatism and 
the national language of Pakistan. However, in the 1970s East Pakistan with 
8. Bilik, “Language, Ethnicity, and Internal Frontiers.”
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its Bengali-speaking Muslim population broke off from Pakistan and formed 
Bangladesh (the country of Bengalis) partly because of linguistic discrimination.
In China, however, language is not in that way intimately tied to religious 
communities, except for Tibetan Buddhists and Uyghur Muslims who indeed 
on a variety of religious, cultural, and linguistic grounds demand a separate 
nation/state. The Hui minority in China lives dispersed over the country and 
speaks mutually unintelligible dialects and languages very much like Muslims 
in India who speak Tamil, Malayalam, or Bengali, the languages of the regions 
in which they live. However, the Hui do not have a numerical presence in China 
and a widespread “Muslim language” like Urdu that could provide for strong 
ethnic-religious mobilization. Arabic, the language of the Quran, provides access 
to religious texts in madrassa education but is in India and in China not the 
language of communication among Muslims. Similarly, Buddhists and Taoists 
learn forms of language that give them access to the sacred canon, but these are 
languages of religious education rather than communication.
In China today there is a disjuncture between the widespread availability 
of temples, monasteries, sacred places as well as the ubiquitous availability of 
numerological speculation and geomancy on the one hand and the removal of 
religion from education on the other. How then do people learn about religious 
ideas and behavior outside the family? When it is more or less allowed to 
perform religion how does one know what is correct and what is not in the 
absence of religious education? It is striking that in the emergence and rise of 
the Falungong out of the plethora of Qigong movements in the 1990s it is not 
the internal religious debate about correct beliefs and practices that determine 
its fate, but the decision by the state that it is politically dangerous. By banning 
religion from education, but not from public life and consciousness the state 
is effectively leaving this social space open for religious imagination. This 
imagination is fuelled by a wide range of image producers, most prominently television and ilm. This may not make religion into a viable ingredient of an 
emerging public sphere, as is the case in Taiwan according to Richard Madsen, 
but it does produce a highly creative arena of exploration. 9
9. Madsen, Democracy’s Dharma.
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